La Economía del Bien Común (EBC) representa un modelo que, sin llegar a poner en cuestión la libertad de mercado, propone una visión más humana de la economía a través del bien común y la cooperación. Se trata de un modelo global e integral que se está desarrollando especialmente en el campo de la microeconomía. El objetivo de este trabajo es, una vez identificadas las características básicas del modelo del EBC, justificar sus fundamentos teóricos desde el punto de vista organizativo, (...) en particular, desde la teoría de los stakeholders. El Balance del Bien Común, como herramienta que sirve para implementar el modelo de la EBC, utilitza una matriz de doble entrada, que sirve para medir la aportación de las empresas en la consecución de los principios de los derechos humanos a través de su relación con los stakeholders.The Economy of the Common Good ecb represents a model that, without questioning market freedom, proposes a more humane vision of the economy, through the common good and cooperation. It is a global and comprehensive model that is being developed above all in the field of microeconomics. The objective of the work is, after identifying the basic characteristics of the ecb model, to justify its theoretical foundations from the organizational point of view, in particular, from Stakeholders’ Theory. The Balance of the Common Good, as a tool that serves to implement the ecb model, uses a double entry matrix, which serves to measure the contribution of companies to the achievement of human rights principles through their relationship with the stakeholders. (shrink)

ResumenDado que George Santayana mostró simpatía hacia regímenes no democráticos y hay una faceta escéptica en su filosofía, una cuestión ambigua es la de su auténtica ideología política. Para responderla hay que abordar la sugerente teoría crítica de las ideologías que esbozó en su Dominations and Powers, y tener en cuenta su concepción de la filosofía política. Como resultado relativizamos su simpatía hacia regímenes no democráticos, pero al mismo tiempo señalamos las debilidades de su posición política personal así como las (...) ventajas y límites de su doctrina de las ideologías.Palabras claveFilosofía política, liberalismo, poder, virtud políticaAbstractAs George Santayana showed sympathy to non-democratic regimes and there is a skeptical side in his philosophy, the question of which was his real political ideology becomes elusive. To answer it we should turn to the suggestive critical theory of ideologies he outlined in his Dominations and Powers, and take into account his conception of political philosophy. As a result, we attenuate his sympathy to non-democratic regimes but we also point out the flaws of his personal political position as well as the pros and cons of his doctrine of ideologies.KeywordsPolitical philosophy, liberalism, power, political virtue. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo tiene por objetivo mostrar la mutua correspondencia entre experiencia e historicidad en la obra de Hans-Georg Gadamer. La experiencia es entendida como el movimiento fundamental de la existencia histórica, la que articula las diversas esferas de la acción humana. La experiencia hermenéutica pone de manifiesto que el comprender no puede fundarse en un procedimiento metódico, sino en la forma del existir situado en el mundo. El acto hermenéutico es entendido como un continuo proceso de apropiación, que se (...) realiza mediante el lenguaje, y donde se van actualizando nuevos significados que develan el carácter aconteciente y móvil de la interpretación. Por ello, la historicidad de la comprensión será el principio hermenéutico fundamental que excluye la posibilidad de una conciencia histórica absoluta, a favor de una “conciencia de la repercusión histórica” (wirkungsgeschtliches Bewußtseins). The following article aims at showing the mutual correspondence between experience and historicity in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Experience is understood as the fundamental movement of the historical existence, whichvarious spheres ofhuman action. The hermeneutic experience shows thatnot lie in methodical procedure, but in the way of existence in the world. The hermeneuticis understood as a continuing process that is carried out through language and where new meanings are updated, that reveal mobile characteristics of the interpretation. Therefore, the understanding the hermeneutical principle which excludes possibility ofabsolute consciousness, in favor of a historically-effected consciousness (wirkungsgeschtliches Bewußtseins). (shrink)

Las crisis son un problema perenne de la sociedad. En las crisis lo que está en crisis es la insuficiencia del modo de relacionarse las personas entre sí, y con los objetos de su cultura, para sustentar su asociación. Las crisis nos interrogan sobre la sustentabilidad social . Podríamos estar entrando en la tendencia hacia una crisis fundamental de insustentabilidad social global . Desde ella es interpelada la Ética de Sociedad. Queda abierta la pregunta: ¿Será posible la convivencia en la (...) sociedad global crísica sin el pivote de una justicia global ? Como efecto colateral e inevitable de las crisis, la sociología —y las ciencias sociales en su conjunto— enfrentan una crisis de sincronía teórica ; respecto del saber y el comprender de las crisis de su tiempo en su tiempo. (shrink)

After compulsory secondary education; many teenagers face the process of choosing a university degree. This process involves uncertainties referred to their personal abilities, interests, social expectations and professional future. The present work is aimed at determining whether the reasons behind the selection of a particular university degree differ depending on the chosen degree. Another objective is determining whether these reasons differ significantly according to gender. The sample comprises 983 students belonging to the area of social and legal sciences at the (...) University of Seville. The obtained results reveal the existence of four main reasons behind the selection of university degrees for which significant gender-related differences were observed: easy degree, job opportunities, high wages and provision of social services. Besides, these seven reasons are observed to differ widely in six of the considered degrees. (shrink)

Tras el Descubrimiento de América por Cristóbal Colón, para cuya empresa contó con la decisiva ayuda del dominico fray Diego de Deza, fueron los miembros de la Orden de Santo Domingo los primeros que lucharon por la justicia en la defensa de la dignidad del indígena en la conquista de América durante las primeras décadas del asentamiento español en el Nuevo Mundo y los que, con el debate teológico y filosófico, pusieron en cuestión los Justos Títulos de ocupación por parte (...) de España de las lejanas tierras ultramarinas. También fueron los pioneros que intentaron poner en práctica la tesis evangelizadora aislacionista, seguida después por otras órdenes religiosas. Los nombres de Antonio Montesinos, Pedro de Córdoba, Bartolomé de las Casas, Francisco de Vitoria, Tomás de Berlanga, Domingo de Soto, Melchor Cano y tantos otros forman un grupo destacado de precursores que se adelantaron en el tiempo a la hora de proclamarse defensores de los Derechos Humanos. (shrink)

The concept of science moulded by the Islamic world was shaped by the Koran and the Greek notion of science, transmitted through translations of Greek texts into Arabic. Ibn Hazm’s repre-sentation of science and philosophy is based on that very concept. He is the first Andalucian we find whose extant texts recognise the value of the sciences.

Con motivo del cincuenta aniversario de la muerte de Miguel Asín Palacios, se pasa revista a su aportación a la historia de la filosofía en el Islam, en especial a la andalusí, a través de un breve análisis de sus principales escritos.On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the death of the distinguished Aragonese arabist Miguel Asín Palacios, the autor reviews in this article the contribution of Asín to the history of Islamic philosophy, especially to the philosophy of Al-Andalus, (...) through a brief analysis of his main writings. (shrink)

The recent resurgence of extreme-right movements and the nationalist turn of many governments across the world have reignited the relevance of discussions within educational philosophy about the teaching of national identity in schools. However, the conceptualisation of national identity in previous iterations of these debates have been largely Western and Eurocentric, making the past theoretical literature about these questions less relevant for post-colonial settings. In this paper, I imagine a new approach for teaching national identity in post-colonial contexts, founded on (...) postcolonial conceptions of identity and in particular, the concept of hybridity. I first develop a postcolonial account of national identity by drawing on Homi Bhabha’s thinking about cultural identity, drawing on his concepts of liminality, splitting, and ambivalence. Then, building on Bhabha's notion of hybridity, I propose a distinction between national identity portrayals as either fixed or malleable. Finally, I demonstrate the implications of such a conceptual distinction on the way that national identity is taught in post-colonial schools; by way of an example, I envision a concrete approach to teaching national identity that views national identity as malleable rather than fixed, set in a hypothetical postcolonial school in the Philippines. By beginning from postcolonial assumptions about national identity, I hope to indicate new directions that the debates about the teaching of national identity in schools might proceed. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to explore the note-taking experiences of university students using paper-based and paperless resources. By means of a hermeneutic phenomenological approach, the note-taking experiences of 18 students from an international program at a university in Belgium were examined throughout a semester. In order to document these students’ practices with paper-based and paperless resources, four data collection methods were used: in-depth interviews observations focus group discussions and document analysis of students’ lecture notes. The results showed that (...) students experience note-taking as a complex phenomenon in which lived body, lived human relations, lived space and lived time come into play, and in which they try to find a balance between multiple engagements, between autonomy and authority, between attention and distraction, and between being original and mirroring others. This struggle for balance occurs irrespective of which medium they choose to use. These results provide an in-depth view of the phenomenon, and also highlight the complexity of the note-taking experience. (shrink)

We present a map of standard quantum mechanics onto a dual theory, that of the classical thermodynamics of irreversible processes. While no gravity is present in our construction, our map exhibits features that are reminiscent of the holographic principle of quantum gravity.

The recent resurgence of extreme-right movements and the nationalist turn of many governments across the world have reignited the relevance of discussions within educational philosophy about the teaching of national identity in schools. However, the conceptualisation of national identity in previous iterations of these debates have been largely Western and Eurocentric, making the past theoretical literature about these questions less relevant for post-colonial settings. In this paper, I imagine a new approach for teaching national identity in post- colonial contexts, founded (...) on postcolonial conceptions of identity and in particular, the concept of hybridity. I first develop a postcolonial account of national identity by drawing on Homi Bhabha’s thinking about cultural identity, drawing on his concepts of liminality, splitting, and ambivalence. Then, building on Bhabha’s notion of hybridity, I propose a distinction between national identity portrayals as either fixed or malleable. Finally, I demonstrate the implications of such a conceptual distinction on the way that national identity is taught in post-colonial schools; by way of an example, I envision a concrete approach to teaching national identity that views national identity as malleable rather than fixed, set in a hypothetical postcolonial school in the Philippines. By beginning from postcolonial assumptions about national identity, I hope to indicate new directions that the debates about the teaching of national identity in schools might proceed. (shrink)

This paper explores the meaning of ‘decolonization’ in relation to the school curriculum and the role of the philosopher of education in this task. Taking the Philippines as an example, this paper illustrates how coloniality has underpinned not only school curricula, but also entire systems of formal education in the post-colony. Following from this, it argues that decolonization in education must transcend the diversification of curricula and aim at a broader vision of justice. Drawing from the author’s own attempts to (...) reimagine the teaching of national identity, the paper proposes that philosophers of education who wish to participate in the work of decoloniality view their contribution as the three-fold task of historical critique, conceptual retrieval, and creative reimagination. (shrink)

Desde que Asín Palacios publicó su estudio pionero sobre Ibn Masarra a partir de las fuentes indirectasdisponibles, proponiendo que su pensamiento estaba inspirado en los escritos del Pseudo-Empédoclesárabe y que había sido el introductor de la filosofía en al-Andalus, seinició el debate al respecto. El hallazgo de dos de las obras del autor cordobés ha dado una nueva orientacióna la polémica. En este artículo se revisan algunos aspectos fundamentales del debate sobre la «reconstrucción» del pensamiento masarrí realizada por Asín, cuestionando (...) el supuesto influjo del Pseudo-Empédocles, y se analiza el texto de Ibn ÔArabı¯ de Murcia que inspiró la asociación entre la imagen delas cinco columnas atribuida a Ibn Masarra y los cinco principios del Pseudos-Empédocles.Since Asín Palacios first published his pioneering study on the Andalusian thinker Ibn Masarra, basedon indirect sources, there has been an intense debate on some of his conjectures: he proposed that Ibn Masarrawas influenced by the writings of the so-called Pseudo-Empedocles and he introduced Philosophy in al-Andalus. The discovery of two unknown works by the author provideda new framework for discussion. The present article examines Asín’s «reconstruction» of Ibn Masarra’sthought, analysing the theory of the Pseudo-Empedocles influence, as well as a text by Ibn ÔArabı¯ which inspired the association of the image of the five pillars attributed to Ibn Masarra with the five principles of the Pseudo-Empedocles. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that some human reproductive genome editing interventions can be therapeutic in nature, and thus that it is false that all such interventions just create healthy individuals. I do this by showing that the conditions established by a therapy definition are met by certain reproductive genome editing interventions. I then defend this position against two objections: (a) reproductive genome editing interventions do not attain one of the two conditions for something to be a therapy, and (b) (...) some reproductive genome editing interventions are therapeutic but in a nonstandard way. In the Conclusion I call for a more nuanced discussion of the nature of reproductive genome editing interventions. (shrink)

Computer simulations have conventionally been understood to be either extensions of formal methods such as mathematical models or as special cases of empirical practices such as experiments. Here, I argue that computer simulations are best understood as instruments. Understanding them as such can better elucidate their actual role as well as their potential epistemic standing in relation to science and other scientific methods, practices and devices.

In this paper I argue that Artificial Intelligence and the many data science methods associated with it, such as machine learning and large language models, are first and foremost epistemic technologies. In order to establish this claim, I first argue that epistemic technologies can be conceptually and practically distinguished from other technologies in virtue of what they are designed for, what they do and how they do it. I then proceed to show that unlike other kinds of technology (_including_ other (...) epistemic technologies) AI can be uniquely positioned as an epistemic technology in that it is primarily designed, developed and deployed to be used in _epistemic contexts_ such as inquiry, it is specifically designed, developed and deployed to manipulate _epistemic content_ such as data, _and_ it is designed, developed and deployed to do so particularly through _epistemic operations_ such as prediction and analysis. As has been shown in recent work in the philosophy and ethics of AI (Alvarado, AI and Ethics, 2022a), understanding AI as an epistemic technology will also have significant implications for important debates regarding our relationship to AI technologies. This paper includes a brief overview of such implications, particularly those pertaining to explainability, opacity, trust and even epistemic harms related to AI technologies. (shrink)

Moral subjectivism is commonly associated with out-of-favour theories like, e.g., Alfred Ayer’s emotivism or John Mackie’s error theory. This paper approaches the field against the background of the attitudinal character of morality and religion. The possibility of a brand of moral subjectivism is established which is common to Ayer’s and Mackie’s theories in name only yet still has significant merits. The perspective from action theory and the philosophy of mind suggests that the problem of moral obligation, central to moral philosophy, (...) is more convincingly dealt with by subjectivism than by its rivals: In contrast to realism or even relativism (with which subjectivism is often confused), subjectivism can help to explain the peculiarities of obligation without forcing us to disregard the parallel problem in the field of religion. This finding calls into question the rationale for, as well as the success of, central assumptions in ontology and semantics which the realist so freely hands out in order to make his point: If religious facts and the truth-aptness of religious judgements will not explain religious obligation, moral facts and the truth-aptness of moral judgements will not help the moral realist either. So unless we do not wish to simply cast the problem of moral obligation aside, in future, moral subjectivism must be seriously considered as a worthwhile position in its own right. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ********** Moralischer Subjektivismus ist ein Oberbegriff für Theorien wie Alfred Ayers „Emotivismus“ und John Mackies „Irrtumstheorie“, die heute kaum noch Vertreter finden. In diesem Aufsatz beleuchte ich das Feld vom Einstellungscharakter von Moral und Religion her. Ich lege so die Möglichkeit eines anderen moralischen Subjektivismus dar, der mit Ayers oder Mackies Theorie nur das Rubrum gemein hätte und doch gewichtige Vorzüge aufweist. Die handlungstheoretische Betrachtung von Moral und Religion mit Hilfe der Philosophie des Geistes legt nahe, dass dieser moralische Subjektivismus mit dem für die Moralphilosophie zentralen Problem des moralischen Sollens besser umgehen kann als seine Rivalen: Anders als der Realismus oder gar der Relativismus (mit dem der Subjektivismus oft verwechselt wird), kann der hier ausgeleuchtete Subjektivismus mit der besonderen Verbindlichkeit moralischer Forderungen umgehen, ohne die Parallele zur besonderen Verbindlichkeit religiöser Forderungen in Abrede stellen zu müssen. Die Rolle und Durchschlagkraft der vom Realisten so freigiebig gespendeten ontologischen oder semantischen Zusatzannahmen er- scheint vor diesem Hintergrund fragwürdig. Dem religiösen Realisten wird man vergleichbare Annahmen nicht zugeben wollen und muss es auch nicht. Dann aber können wir die Erklärung besonderer Verbindlichkeit generell nicht auf Ontologie oder Semantik gründen. Der verbreitete Appell an sogenannte moralische Tatsachen oder die behauptete Wahrheitsfähigkeit moralischer Sätze erweist sich so als wirkungslos. Sofern wir das Problem des moralischen Sollens überhaupt weiter ernst nehmen wollen, muss der moralische Subjektivismus als Position künftig ernsthaft erwogen werden. (shrink)

Aquí se presenta un avance de la investigación acerca de la filosofíaandina prehispánica que parte de la organización de los fragmentos,textos o relatos hallados en los documentos de extirpación deidolatrías, de las crónicas de los españoles, de los informes de lacasta sacerdotal del virreinato, registrados durante la colonizaciónespañola del Perú. En éste, en lo fundamental, se presenta laargumentación sobre la teoría del pensamiento y los problemasfundamentales de la filosofía. Se trata del contenido monumentaldel pensamiento filosófico andino prehispánico perdido entre laabundancia (...) de argumentos y comunicaciones de carácter religioso,mágico y mítico dominante. Con esto esperamos demostrar que síexistió filosofía en el mundo andino prehispánico según un esquemaacorde a la matriz planteada por la filosofía occidental griega. (shrink)

What is discrimination and what makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Even after an ever-rising tide of research over the course of the past twenty-five or so years these questions still remain hard to answer. Exercising candid and self-critical hindsight, Larry Alexander, who contributed his fair share to this tide, thus remarked: “All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.” If this is true it (...) raises serious doubts as to how wrongful discrimination can be a moral wrong in itself. Also, the question comes up as to who it is who breaches a promise or a fiduciary duty. This paper defends the view that the substance of these remarks is better understood by couching them in a political approach towards discrimination. Against this background, they give rise to real and pressing concerns. Once we conceptualise the realm political along Hobbesian lines as the battleground comprising both the private sphere of the individual and the public sphere of the commonwealth it emerges that discrimination has different significance with regard to these respective spheres. In order to illustrate this, I adopt Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s descriptive account of discrimination as „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ and the common view that wrongful discrimination is wrong because it is harmful, disrespectful, or both. In the private sphere the case can be made for morally permissible cases of discrimination. Sexual discrimination due to sexual self-determination with consequently freely choosing your sexual or romantic partner is the central case in point. Where somebody feels unfairly rejected and consequently hurt neither the charge of harm inflicted nor that of disrespect endured need be justified. No “breach of promises or fiduciary duties” is involved. The case is different, however, when it comes to the fiduciary of power. In discriminating, he who exercises the power of the commonwealth necessarily breaches a promise and a fiduciary duty. Discrimination thus appears to be more of a problem of political philosophy than one of applied ethics. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ******************** Was ist Diskriminierung und warum ist Diskriminierung verwerflich, wenn sie es denn ist? Dies bleibt ungeachtet der seit fünfundzwanzig Jahren anschwellenden Forschungsliteratur unverändert eine harte Nuss. Larry Alexander, der selbst maßgeblich zu dieser Forschungsliteratur beigetragen hat, merkt daher selbstkritisch an: „All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.“ Wenn dies der Fall ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie moralisch verwerfliche Diskriminierung dann noch an sich verwerflich sein kann. Es stellt sich dann auch die Frage, wer hier ein Versprechen bricht und seine Treuepflichten verletzt. Die leitende Annahme dieses Aufsatzes ist es, dass man dem sachlichen Kern dieser Bedenken Rechnung tragen kann, indem man eine politische Perspektive auf das Phänomen der Diskriminierung einnimmt. Die Bedenken erweisen sich dann als substanziell und zutreffend. Konzeptualisieren wir den Bereich des Politischen mit Thomas Hobbes als das Spannungsfeld, das die private Sphäre des Individuums und die öffentliche Sphäre des Gemeinwesens gegeneinander abgrenzt, wird sichtbar, dass Diskriminierung in diesen Sphären jeweils unterschiedlich zu bewerten ist. Um dies zu verdeutlichen, lege ich Kasper Lippert-Rasmussens deskriptives Verständnis von Diskriminierung als „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ zugrunde und mache von der in der Diskussion verbreiteten Ansicht Gebrauch, dass das Zufügen von Schaden oder die Verweigerung von Respekt Diskriminierung verwerflich macht. In der privaten Sphäre kann es nun Fälle moralisch zulässiger Diskriminierung geben. Zentral ist die sexuelle Diskriminierung aufgrund der Ausübung einer freien Wahl des eigenen Sexual- oder Liebespartners. Auch wenn sich der Abgewiesene womöglich geschädigt sieht, wird unbilliger Schaden nicht zugefügt und geschul- deter Respekt nicht verweigert. Den Grund finden wir in Alexanders Formel: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt nicht vor. Anders im Fall staatlicher Diskriminierung: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt hier stets vor, da Fälle staatlicher Diskriminierung regelmäßig Machtmissbrauch darstellen: Der Inhaber staatlicher Gewalt verletzt die Treuepflicht, das Mandat unparteilich auszuüben, das getreulich auszuführen er gelobt hat. Diskriminierung erscheint also weniger als ein Problem der angewandten Ethik denn als eines der politischen Philosophie. (shrink)

It has been commonplace to equate Foucault’s 1979 series of lectures at the Collège de France with the claim that for neoliberalism, unlike for classical liberalism, the market needs to be artificially constructed. The article expands this claim to its full expression, taking it beyond what otherwise would be a simple divulgation of a basic neoliberal tenet. It zeroes in on Foucault’s own insight: that neoliberal constructivism is not directed at the market as such, but, in principle, at society, arguing (...) that the value of this insight goes beyond the critique of a neoliberal present. The neoliberal rationale rather helps him to reveal a unique historical architecture, a latent approach to the social dissimilar to the one that has long predominated in the human sciences. The inversion of homo œconomicus in neoliberal theory amounted to the unearthing of a ‘social subject of interest’ within civil society. Such a subject, barely recognized by neoliberals who simply instrumentalize it for the sake of the market, demonstrates that the social is not necessarily the natural product of ethical subjects; that society may also need to be constructed. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 2, Page 121-133, February 2022.

It is widely supposed that evolutionary debunking arguments against morality constitute a type of epistemological objection to our moral beliefs. In particular, the debunking force of such arguments is not supposed to depend on the metaphysical claim that moral facts do not exist. In this paper I argue that this standard epistemological construal of EDAs is highly misleading, if not mistaken. Specifically, I argue that the most widely discussed EDAs all make key and controversial metaphysical claims about the nature of (...) morality or the possibility of moral truth that belie their apparently epistemological character. I show that the debunking force of these EDAs derives largely from metaphysical claims about morality and their implications for the possibility of moral reduction, rather than from epistemological worries associated with the existence of an causal/non-moral explanation of our moral judgments. The paper briefly concludes with a dilemma that I believe confronts all EDAs such as those discussed in this paper: either such arguments are unsound, or else they prove too much, debunking our knowledge of science and the external world, as well as morality. (shrink)

A ‘companions in guilt’ strategy against moral error theory aims to show that the latter proves too much: if sound, it supports an implausible error-theoretic conclusion in other areas such as epistemic or practical reasoning. Christopher Cowie [2016 Cowie, C. 2016. Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94/1: 115–30.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar]] has recently produced what he claims is a ‘master argument’ against (...) all such strategies. The essence of his argument is that CG arguments cannot work because they are afflicted by internal incoherence or inconsistency. I argue, first, that Cowie's master argument does not succeed. Beyond this, I argue that there is no good reason to think that any such argument—one that purports to identify an internal incoherence in CG arguments—can succeed. Second, I argue that the main substantive area of disagreement between error theorists and CG theorists essentially concerns the conceptual profile of epistemic reasons—specifically, whether they are strongly categorical—not the ontological question of whether such reasons exist. I then develop an argument in favour of the CG theorist's position by considering the moral error theorist's arguments in support of the conceptual claim that moral reasons are strongly categorical. These include, notably, criticisms made by Joyce [2011] and Olson [2014] of Finlay's [2008] ‘end relational’ view of morality, according to which moral reasons are relative to some end or standard, hence not strongly categorical. Examining these criticisms, I argue that, based on what moral error theorists have said regarding the conceptual profile of moral reasons, there is a strong case to be made that moral reasons are strongly categorical if and only if epistemic reasons are. (shrink)

The rapid development of large language models (LLM’s) and of their associated interfaces such as ChatGPT has brought forth a wave of epistemic and moral concerns in a variety of domains of inquiry...

Among the extra-physical aspects of team sports, the ways in which players talk to each other are among the more colorful but understudied dimensions of competition. To contribute an empirical basis for examining the nature of “trash talk,” we present the results of a study of 291 varsity athletes who compete in the top division among US universities. Based on a preliminary review of trash-talk topics among student-athletes, we asked participants to indicate the frequency with which they have communicated or (...) heard others talk about opposing players’ athleticism, playing ability, physical appearance, boyfriends, girlfriends, sexual behavior, parents, and home institution during competitions. Our three main findings are: Trash-talking is most commonly about the proximately important topic of playing ability while ultimately relevant topics such as physical appearance also appear to be common; Men appear to trash-talk significantly more than women, and consistently across topics; and contact sports such as football, hockey, lacrosse, and wrestling are associated with trash talk significantly more than other sports. We also examined whether the anonymity provided by face-masked helmets in “combat sports” was associated with more trash talk than contact sports played without a helmet and found no consistent association with face masks. Our findings highlight the ways in which competitors in physical sporting contests attempt to use language—often in ways that focus on players’ kin or reproductive interests—in pursuit of victory while establishing a baseline for future research into trash-talking. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

El artículo revisa los argumentos a favor y en contra de que el público financie directa y voluntariamente la actividad cultural. Se parte de que los mecanismos de financiación elegidos por las políticas culturales tienen una dimensión ética y no solo una finalidad instrumental. Utilizando el enfoque comparativo propuesto por A. Sen, se investiga si el micro-mecenazgo y otras formas de inversión por parte de los consumidores culturales constituyen formas de mecenazgo ciudadano valiosas desde un punto de vista ético. A (...) pesar de que las políticas culturales a favor del micro-mecenazgo pueden ser acusadas de paternalistas o de mercantilizar la vida cultural, se defiende que el mecenazgo ciudadano es una innovación social que fomenta la responsabilidad social de los consumidores culturales. En tal sentido las políticas culturales deben tener en cuenta que el comportamiento privado de consumo e inversión también es una forma de participación en la vida social. (shrink)